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Elliott: Criminal Law and Procedure

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
WILLIAM TALLEY ELLIOTT*
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW

There have been few cases involving substantive criminal
law during the period covered by this analysis.
In the case of State v. Grantham,' the Court held that the
defendant, who shot his wife in their home while she was advancing upon him with a butcher knife, was under no duty
to retreat and could support his plea of self-defense as he had
not provoked the difficulty.
State v. Keller2 reaffirmed the doctrine of knowing right
from wrong as a test of criminal responsibility under a plea
of insanity as a defense to the commission of a crime. Our
Court has expressly repudiated the irresistible impulse theory
as a defense.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

In State v. Waitus,3 the defendant, a negro, was convicted
of murder. There was evidence that, in the county in which
he was tried, ten percent of the qualified electors were negroes
and that for at least twelve years no negro had sat either
on the grand or petit jury in that county. The Court, on appeal, held that the facts made out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination in the selection of the jury before which the
4
defendant was tried. The judgment was reversed.
5
The case of State v. Gantt involved a jurisdictional question. The defendant was indicted and tried for murder. The
Court held that the county in which the fatal blow was struck
was the proper venue for the homicide prosecution even though
the deceased may have died outside the state.
In the case of State v. Sessions, 6 the Court held that the
crime of assault and battery with intent to kill is a misde*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 224 S.C. 41, 77 S.E. 2d 291 (1953).
2. 224 S.C. 257,78 S.E. 2d 373 (1953).
3. 224 S.C. 12, 77 S.E. 2d 257 (1953).
4. U. S. CONST., Amend. XIV; S. C. CONST., Art. II, § 1 et seq., Art.
V, § 22.
5. 223 S.C. 431, 76 S.E. 2d 674 (1953).
6. 81 S.E. 2d 287 (S.C. 1954).
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meanor. As a result, the defendant could be tried in his absence.
The question of after-discovered evidence was passed upon
by the Court in the case of State v. Clamp.7 The defendant
was convicted of burglary. He moved for a new trial on the
grounds of after-discovered evidence. His motion was denied
by the lower court. The Supreme Court upheld the judgment
of the lower court. It laid down the rule that in order to grant
a new trial on the ground of after-discovered evidence, it must
appear that the evidence is such as will probably change the
result if a new trial is granted; that it has been discovered
since trial; that it could not have been discovered before trial
by the exercise of due diligence; that it is material to the issue
and that it is not merely cumulative or impeaching.
State v. Miller8 is a case of interest. The defendant had been
acquitted under an indictment that charged him with breaking into and larceny of the goods of a store "and others." Another indictment charged him with housebreaking and entering an enclosed United States Post Office located in the store
and larceny of money belonging to the United States. When
brought to trial upon the second indictment, he entered a plea
of former jeopardy and autrefois acquit. The lower court overruled both pleas and he was convicted.
Upon appeal the Court held that the acquittal for housebreaking into the store did not bar the prosecution for housebreaking and entering the Post Office, but that acquittal under
the charge of larceny of the goods of the store "and others"
barred the prosecution for larceny of money of the United
States in the Post Office.

7. 80 S.E. 2d 918 (S.C. 1954).
8. 225 S.C. 21, 80 S.E. 2d 354 (1954).
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